這是我近期讀過關(guān)于巴菲特的最佳讀物之一：不是巴菲特的股東信、股東大會(huì)，甚至也不是他的演講，而是一篇他多年前親筆寫就的文章——發(fā)表于1979年的《福布斯》。沒錯(cuò)，這是一篇已經(jīng)“44歲”的老文章，可能比許多讀者還要老——但我相信這篇文章依然值得一讀，里面對(duì)于估值、市場(chǎng)、機(jī)構(gòu)、宏觀的討論依然值得今天的投資者深思。有意思的是，那一年巴菲特還只有48歲，他已經(jīng)挺有市場(chǎng)影響力，但顯然還沒有那么“出圈”。一個(gè)顯著的證據(jù)就是，《福布斯》的編輯甚至需要在文章開頭，特別介紹一下作者是誰：“沃倫·巴菲特是一位48歲的腳踏實(shí)地的人，他喜歡在他的家鄉(xiāng)奧馬哈工作，而不是在華爾街的峽谷里，但專業(yè)人士認(rèn)為他可能是現(xiàn)存最成功的資金管理者，是傳奇人物本·格雷厄姆的直系“后裔”，他曾在格雷厄姆門下學(xué)習(xí)。”這篇文章值得推薦的另一個(gè)原因是，1979年的美股處于很特別的宏觀和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境：1970年代通脹高企（通脹率最高達(dá)到13%），報(bào)紙時(shí)不時(shí)出現(xiàn)大新聞，投資者深刻感受到未來的不確定性，股票備受投資者們厭惡。1979年的美股氛圍是低迷和悲觀的，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)正處于滯脹的困境，通脹率高達(dá)13.3％，失業(yè)率也達(dá)到5.8％，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)緩慢。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為了遏制通脹，采取了大幅加息的措施，導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)利率飆升，債券價(jià)格下跌，股票投資失去吸引力。同時(shí)，美國(guó)還受到了第二次石油危機(jī)的沖擊，石油價(jià)格翻了一番，能源供應(yīng)緊張，對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)造成了巨大的負(fù)擔(dān)。 1979年的一個(gè)標(biāo)志性事件是，《商業(yè)周刊》在8月發(fā)表了一篇著名的封面故事——《股票之死》，文中說到：“不論是好還是壞，接下來，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)必須考慮把股票之死視為是一個(gè)永遠(yuǎn)存在的條件，也許有天這個(gè)狀況會(huì)反轉(zhuǎn)，但不會(huì)很快發(fā)生。”在這樣的氛圍里，中年巴菲特寫下這篇：《You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus》，批評(píng)短視的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者們（養(yǎng)老基金），明知道股票很便宜，卻因?yàn)橐恍┢婀值囊蛩?，而癡癡地等待確定性。未來從來都是不明確的；在股市中，你要為一片歡騰的共識(shí)付出很高的代價(jià)。不確定性實(shí)際上是長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值買家的朋友。
The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.以下是這篇文章的全文，同時(shí)附上中文譯文——由AI進(jìn)行翻譯（綜合New Bing、ChatGPT 3.5），我略作調(diào)整。如對(duì)中文有疑問，請(qǐng)以英文為準(zhǔn)。
You Pay A Very High Price In The Stock Market For A Cheery Consensus在股市中，你要為一片歡騰的共識(shí)付出很高代價(jià) Pension-fund managers continue to make investment decisions with their eyes firmly fixed on the rearview mirror. This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.養(yǎng)老金基金經(jīng)理們?cè)谧鐾顿Y決策時(shí)，仍然只顧著看后視鏡。這種打仗總是打上一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的做法，在過去已經(jīng)造成了很大的代價(jià)，而且這一次也很可能同樣代價(jià)慘重。Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds. Yet pensions managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please ('whose bread I eat, his song I sing'), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.現(xiàn)在的股票價(jià)格水平應(yīng)該能產(chǎn)生遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)優(yōu)于債券的長(zhǎng)期回報(bào)。然而，養(yǎng)老金基金經(jīng)理們，通常受到他們必須討好的企業(yè)贊助者的鼓勵(lì)（“誰給我飯吃，我就唱誰的歌”），正以創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的比例把資金投入到債券中。Meanwhile, orders for stocks are being placed with an eyedropper. Parkinson--of Parkinson's law fame--might conclude that the enthusiasm of professionals for stocks varies proportionately with the recent pleasure derived from ownership. This always was the way John Q. Public was expected to behave. John Q. Expert seems similarly afflicted. Here's the record.與此同時(shí)，對(duì)股票的訂單卻是少得可憐。帕金森（出名的帕金森定律的作者）可能會(huì)得出這樣的結(jié)論：專業(yè)人士對(duì)股票的熱情與最近從持有股票中獲得的快感成正比。這種行為一直是我們所期待的約翰·Q·普通人的表現(xiàn)。約翰·Q·專家似乎也同樣受到了影響。以下是記錄。In 1972, when the Dow earned $67.11, or 11% on beginning book value of 607, it closed the year selling at 1,020, and pension managers couldn't buy stocks fast enough. Purchases of equities in 1972 were 105% of net funds available (i.e., bonds were sold), a record except for the 122% of the even more buoyant prior year. This two-year stampede increased the equity portion of total pension assets from 61% to 74%--an all-time record that coincided nicely with a record-high price for the Dow. The more investment managers paid for stocks, the better they felt about them.1972年，道瓊斯指數(shù)賺了67.11美元，相當(dāng)于607美元的期初賬面價(jià)值的11%，年底收于1020美元，養(yǎng)老金經(jīng)理們急著買入股票。1972年的股票購買額占凈可用資金的105%（即賣出了債券），除了前一年更為繁榮的122%外，創(chuàng)下了歷史新高。這兩年的狂奔使得養(yǎng)老金總資產(chǎn)中的股票部分從61%增加到74%——與道瓊斯指數(shù)創(chuàng)下歷史新高的價(jià)格相得益彰。投資經(jīng)理們?yōu)楣善备冻龅脑蕉?，他們?duì)股票就越滿意。And then the market went into a tailspin in 1973-74. Although the Dow earned $99.04 in 1974, or 14% on beginning book value of 690, it finished the year selling at 616. A bargain? Alas, such bargain prices produced panic rather than purchases; only 21% of net investable funds went into equities that year, a 25-year record low. The proportion of equities held by private noninsured pension plans fell to 54% of net assets, a full 20-point drop from the level deemed appropriate when the Dow was 400 points higher.然后市場(chǎng)在1973-74年間陷入了低迷。盡管道瓊斯指數(shù)在1974年賺了99.04美元，相當(dāng)于690美元期初賬面價(jià)值的14%，但它在年底收于616點(diǎn)。便宜貨？唉，這樣的便宜貨卻引發(fā)了恐慌而不是購買；那一年只有21%的凈可投資資金投入到股票中，創(chuàng)下25年來的最低紀(jì)錄。私人非保險(xiǎn)養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃持有的股票占凈資產(chǎn)的比例下降到54%，比道瓊斯指數(shù)高出400點(diǎn)時(shí)認(rèn)為合適的水平低了整整20個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。By 1976, the courage of pension managers rose in tandem with the price level, and 56% of available funds was committed to stocks. The Dow that year averaged close to 1,000, a level then about 25% above book value.到了1976年，隨著價(jià)格水平上升，養(yǎng)老金基金經(jīng)理們的勇氣也隨之增長(zhǎng)，56%的可用資金被投入到股票中。那一年道瓊斯指數(shù)接近1000點(diǎn)，大約比賬面價(jià)值高出25%。In 1978, stocks were valued far more reasonably, with the Dow selling below book value most of the time. Yet a new low of 9% of net funds was invested in equities during the year. The first quarter of 1979 continued at very close to the same level.1978年，股票估值更加合理，道瓊斯指數(shù)大部分時(shí)間都低于賬面價(jià)值。然而，在那一年只有9%的凈可投資資金投入到股票中。1979年第一季度的水平也非常接近。By these actions, pension managers, in record-setting manner, are voting for purchase of bonds--at interest rates of 9% to 10%--and against purchase of American equities at prices aggregating book value or less. But these same pension managers probably would concede that those American equities, in aggregate and over the longer term, would earn about 13% (the average in recent years) on book value. And, overwhelmingly, the managers of their corporate sponsors would agree.通過這些行為，養(yǎng)老金基金經(jīng)理們以創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的方式投票支持購買債券——利率為9%到10%——反對(duì)購買美國(guó)股票，價(jià)格總體上相當(dāng)于或低于賬面價(jià)值。但是，這些養(yǎng)老金基金經(jīng)理們可能會(huì)承認(rèn)，那些美國(guó)股票，總體上和從長(zhǎng)期來看，能夠在賬面價(jià)值上賺取大約13%（近年來的平均水平）。而且，他們的企業(yè)贊助者的管理者們也會(huì)同意。Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of schizophrenia regarding equities. They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive. But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general. And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will eagerly bid 150% to 200% of book value for businesses typical of corporate America but, wearing his pension hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value. Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?事實(shí)上，許多企業(yè)經(jīng)理對(duì)股票表現(xiàn)出一種精神分裂的態(tài)度。他們認(rèn)為自己的股票非常有吸引力。但同時(shí)，他們又批準(zhǔn)了拒絕購買普通股的養(yǎng)老金政策。而老板，在戴著收購帽子的時(shí)候，會(huì)急切地以150%到200%的賬面價(jià)值競(jìng)標(biāo)典型的美國(guó)企業(yè)，但在戴著養(yǎng)老金帽子的時(shí)候，卻會(huì)輕視以賬面價(jià)值投資類似公司的做法。他自己的才能難道是如此獨(dú)特，以至于他既有理由以每美元200分的價(jià)格購買一家企業(yè)，如果他能掌控它的話；又有理由拒絕以每美元100分的價(jià)格作為不明智的養(yǎng)老金投資，如果它必須留給他在Business Roundtable的同伴運(yùn)營(yíng)？A simple Pavlovian response may be the major cause of this puzzling behavior. During the last decade, stocks have produced pain--both for corporate sponsors and for the investment managers the sponsors hire. Neither group wishes to return to the scene of the accident.But the pain has not been produced because business has performed badly, but rather because stocks have underperformed business. Such underperformance cannot prevail indefinitely, any more than could the earlier overperformance of stocks versus business that lured pension money into equities at high prices.一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的巴甫洛夫式反應(yīng)可能是這種令人困惑的行為的主要原因。在過去的十年里，股票給企業(yè)贊助者和他們雇傭的投資經(jīng)理帶來了痛苦。兩者都不愿意回到事故現(xiàn)場(chǎng)。但是造成痛苦的原因并不是因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)表現(xiàn)不佳，而是因?yàn)楣善北憩F(xiàn)不如企業(yè)。這種表現(xiàn)不如企業(yè)的情況不可能永遠(yuǎn)持續(xù)下去，就像早些時(shí)候股票表現(xiàn)超過企業(yè)而吸引養(yǎng)老金資金以高價(jià)購買股票一樣。 Can better results be obtained over, say, 20 years from a group of 9 1/2% bonds of leading American companies maturing in 1999 than from a group of Dow-type equities purchased, in aggregate, at around book value and likely to earn, in aggregate, around 13% on that book value? The probabilities seem exceptionally low. The choice of equities would prove inferior only if either a major sustained decline in return on equity occurs or a ludicrously low valuation of earnings prevails at the end of the 20-year period. Should price/earnings ratios expand over the 20-year period--and that 13% return on equity be averaged--purchases made now at book value will result in better than a 13% annual return. How can bonds at only 9 1/2% be a better buy?比如說，從一組美國(guó)領(lǐng)先公司的9.5%債券中，到1999年到期，能否獲得比從一組以賬面價(jià)值購買的道瓊斯指數(shù)類型的股票中獲得更好的結(jié)果，這些股票在賬面價(jià)值上的平均收益率大約是13%？這種可能性似乎非常低。只有在兩種情況下，選擇股票才會(huì)證明是劣勢(shì)：要么是出現(xiàn)了持續(xù)的股本回報(bào)率下降，要么是在20年期結(jié)束時(shí)，盈利的估值非常低。如果市盈率在20年期內(nèi)擴(kuò)大，而股本回報(bào)率平均為13%，那么以賬面價(jià)值購買的股票現(xiàn)在將會(huì)獲得超過13%的年回報(bào)率。9.5%的債券怎么會(huì)是更好的選擇呢？Think for a moment of book value of the Dow as equivalent to par, or the principal value of a bond. And think of the 13% or so expectable average rate of earnings on that book value as a sort of fluctuating coupon on the bond--a portion of which is retained to add to principal amount just like the interest return on U.S. Savings Bonds. Currently our 'Dow Bond' can be purchased at a significant discount (at about 840 vs. 940 'principal amount,' or book value of the Dow. Figures are based on the old Dow, prior to the recent substitutions. The returns would be moderately higher and the book values somewhat lower if the new Dow had been used.). That Dow Bond purchased at a discount with an average coupon of 13%--even though the coupon will fluctuate with business conditions--seems to me to be a long-term investment far superior to a conventional 9 1/2% 20-year bond purchased at par.暫時(shí)把道瓊斯指數(shù)的賬面價(jià)值想象成等同于票面價(jià)值，或者是債券的本金。把對(duì)賬面價(jià)值的預(yù)期平均收益率（大約13%）想象成一種波動(dòng)的債券票息–其中一部分被保留用來增加本金，就像美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄債券的利息回報(bào)一樣。目前我們的“道瓊斯債券”可以以較低的折扣購買（大約840美元對(duì)940美元的“本金”或道瓊斯指數(shù)的賬面價(jià)值。這些數(shù)字是基于舊的道瓊斯指數(shù)，在最近的替換之前。如果使用新的道瓊斯指數(shù)，回報(bào)率會(huì)稍微高一些，賬面價(jià)值會(huì)稍微低一些。）。這種以折扣購買的、平均票息為13%的道瓊斯債券–即使票息會(huì)隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況波動(dòng)–在我看來是一種遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)優(yōu)于以票面價(jià)值購買的傳統(tǒng)9.5% 20年期債券的長(zhǎng)期投資。Of course, there is no guarantee that future corporate earnings will average 13%. It may be that some pension managers shun stocks because they expect reported returns on equity to fall sharply in the next decade. However, I don't believe such a view is widespread.當(dāng)然，未來的企業(yè)收益能否平均達(dá)到13%并沒有保證。也許有些養(yǎng)老金經(jīng)理避開股票，是因?yàn)樗麄冾A(yù)計(jì)未來十年內(nèi)，股本回報(bào)率會(huì)大幅下降。不過，我不認(rèn)為這種觀點(diǎn)很普遍。Instead, investment managers usually set forth two major objections to the thought that stocks should now be favored over bonds. Some say earnings currently are overstated, with real earnings after replacement-value depreciation far less than those reported. Thus, they say, real 13% earnings aren't available. But that argument ignores the evidence in such investment areas as life insurance, banking, fire-casualty insurance, finance companies, service businesses, etc.相反，投資經(jīng)理通常提出兩個(gè)主要的反對(duì)意見，認(rèn)為股票現(xiàn)在不應(yīng)該比債券更受青睞。有些人說，目前的收益被夸大了，以重置價(jià)值折舊后的實(shí)際收益遠(yuǎn)低于報(bào)告的收益。因此，他們說，實(shí)際上沒有13%的收益可得。但這種論點(diǎn)忽略了諸如人壽保險(xiǎn)、銀行、財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)、金融公司、服務(wù)業(yè)等投資領(lǐng)域的證據(jù)。In those industries, replacement-value accounting would produce results virtually identical with those produced by conventional accounting. And yet, one can put together a very attractive package of large companies in those fields with an expectable return of 13% or better on book value and with a price which, in aggregate, approximates book value. Furthermore, I see no evidence that corporate managers turn their backs on 13% returns in their acquisition decisions because of replacement-value accounting considerations.在這些行業(yè)中，重置價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)會(huì)產(chǎn)生與傳統(tǒng)會(huì)計(jì)幾乎相同的結(jié)果。而且，人們可以在這些領(lǐng)域中挑選出一些大公司，它們的賬面價(jià)值預(yù)期回報(bào)率為13%或更高，而且它們的價(jià)格總體上與賬面價(jià)值相當(dāng)。此外，我沒有看到任何證據(jù)表明，企業(yè)經(jīng)理在他們的收購決策中會(huì)因?yàn)橹刂脙r(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)的考慮而拒絕13%的回報(bào)率。
A second argument is made that there are just too many question marks about the near future; wouldn't it be better to wait until things clear up a bit? You know the prose: 'Maintain buying reserves until current uncertainties are resolved,' etc. Before reaching for that crutch, face up to two unpleasant facts: The future is never clear; you pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus. Uncertainty actually is the friend of the buyer of long-term values.第二個(gè)論點(diǎn)是，關(guān)于近期的前景，有太多的問號(hào)；不是等到事情有些明朗化再行動(dòng)更好嗎？你知道這種說法：“在目前的不確定性解決之前，保持購買儲(chǔ)備”，等等。在訴諸這種支撐之前，面對(duì)兩個(gè)令人不快的事實(shí)：未來從來都是不明確的；在股市中，你要為一片歡騰的共識(shí)付出很高的代價(jià)。不確定性實(shí)際上是長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值買家的朋友。If anyone can afford to have such a long-term perspective in making investment decisions, it should be pension-fund managers. While corporate managers frequently incur large obligations in order to acquire businesses at premium prices, most pension plans have very minor flow-of-funds problems. If they wish to invest for the long term--as they do in buying those 20- and 30-year bonds they now embrace--they certainly are in a position to do so. They can, and should, buy stocks with the attitude and expectations of an investor entering into a long-term partnership.如果有人能夠在做投資決策時(shí)擁有這樣一種長(zhǎng)期的視角，那應(yīng)該是養(yǎng)老金基金經(jīng)理。雖然企業(yè)管理者經(jīng)常為了以溢價(jià)價(jià)格收購企業(yè)而承擔(dān)大量義務(wù)，但大多數(shù)養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃都沒有什么資金流動(dòng)問題。如果他們希望從長(zhǎng)期來看進(jìn)行投資——就像他們現(xiàn)在購買那些20年和30年期限的債券一樣——他們當(dāng)然有能力這樣做。他們可以，并且應(yīng)該以一種投資者進(jìn)入長(zhǎng)期合作伙伴關(guān)系的態(tài)度和期望來購買股票。Corporate managers who duck responsibility for pension management by making easy, conventional or faddish decisions are making an expensive mistake. Pension assets probably total about one-third of overall industrial net worth and, of course, bulk far larger in the case of many specific industrial corporations. Thus, poor management of those assets frequently equates to poor management of the largest single segment of the business. Soundly achieved higher returns will produce significantly greater earnings for the corporate sponsors and will also enhance the security and prospective payments available to pensioners.那些通過做一些容易的、傳統(tǒng)的或者流行的決定來逃避養(yǎng)老金管理責(zé)任的企業(yè)經(jīng)理，正在犯一個(gè)昂貴的錯(cuò)誤。養(yǎng)老金資產(chǎn)可能占工業(yè)凈資產(chǎn)的大約三分之一，當(dāng)然，在許多特定的工業(yè)公司中，這一比例要高得多。因此，對(duì)這些資產(chǎn)的管理不善，往往等于對(duì)企業(yè)最大的單一部分的管理不善。穩(wěn)健地實(shí)現(xiàn)更高的回報(bào)，將為企業(yè)的贊助商帶來顯著更高的收益，也將增強(qiáng)養(yǎng)老金領(lǐng)取者的安全感和預(yù)期收入。Managers currently opting for lower equity ratios either have a highly negative opinion of future American business results or expect to be nimble enough to dance back into stocks at even lower levels. There may well be some period in the near future when financial markets are demoralized and much better buys are available in equities; that possibility exists at all times. But you can be sure that at such a time the future will seem neither predictable nor pleasant. Those now awaiting a 'better time' for equity investing are highly likely to maintain that posture until well into the next bull market.目前選擇較低的股票比例的管理者，要么對(duì)未來美國(guó)商業(yè)的結(jié)果持有非常消極的看法，要么期望能夠靈活地在更低的水平上重新進(jìn)入股市。在不久的將來，可能會(huì)有一段時(shí)間，金融市場(chǎng)處于低迷狀態(tài)，股票中有更好的買入機(jī)會(huì)；這種可能性在任何時(shí)候都存在。但你可以肯定的是，在那樣的時(shí)候，未來既不會(huì)看起來可預(yù)測(cè)，也不會(huì)看起來愉快。那些現(xiàn)在等待著一個(gè)“更好的時(shí)機(jī)”來進(jìn)行股票投資的人，很有可能會(huì)一直保持這種姿態(tài)，直到進(jìn)入下一個(gè)牛市。Editor's Note: This editor's note accompanied the original publication of this article:Warren Buffett is a down-to-earth man of 48 who prefers to operate out of his native Omaha rather than in the canyons of Wall Street, but the pros regard him as possibly the most successful living money manager, a direct descendant of the legendary Ben Graham under whom he studied. Buffett made a fortune for himself and his clients in the Fifties and Sixties but threw in the towel in 1969 because he could no longer find bargains. Then in late 1974, when the Dow Jones industrials were below 600 and the air was thick with doom, he told Forbes: 'I feel like an oversexed man in a harem. This is the time to start investing.' Within months, the greatest rally in history began, with the DJI running almost 450 points in a bit over a year. What does Buffett think now? In this article, he puts it bluntly: Now is the time to buy.沃倫·巴菲特是一位48歲的腳踏實(shí)地的人，他喜歡在他的家鄉(xiāng)奧馬哈工作，而不是在華爾街的峽谷里，但專業(yè)人士認(rèn)為他可能是現(xiàn)存最成功的資金管理者，是傳奇人物本·格雷厄姆的直系“后裔”，他曾在格雷厄姆門下學(xué)習(xí)。巴菲特在五十年代和六十年代為自己和他的客戶賺了一大筆錢，但在1969年他放棄了，因?yàn)樗僖舱也坏奖阋素?。然后?974年底，當(dāng)?shù)拉偹构I(yè)指數(shù)低于600點(diǎn)，空氣中彌漫著厄運(yùn)時(shí)，他對(duì)《福布斯》雜志說：“我覺得自己像一個(gè)在后宮里的過度性欲的男人。這是開始投資的時(shí)候了?！睅讉€(gè)月后，歷史上最大的反彈開始了，道瓊斯工業(yè)指數(shù)在一年多的時(shí)間里漲了近450點(diǎn)。巴菲特現(xiàn)在怎么想？在這篇文章中，他直言不諱地說：現(xiàn)在是買入的時(shí)候了。
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